Thursday, February 20, 2020

Trusted CI delivers final engagement report to US Academic Research Fleet

ARF comprises 18 vessels and the supporting infrastructure equipped to serve the needs of the oceanographic research community.  In the second half of 2019, Trusted CI and the US Academic Research Fleet (ARF) collaborated in an engagement to address the cybersecurity needs of ARF’s research vessels.

The engagement began by determining how the engagement should be scoped. ARF identified the most crucial security related issues they would like to address, including establishing  a unified cyberinfrastructure security plan that will both serve the evolving security needs of its community and prepare the ARF for operational cybersecurity requirements due to be enforced by the  International Maritime Organization 2021 cybersecurity regulations.

The first month was spent gathering information from ARF and policies and information from all ships in the fleet.  The Trusted CI engagement team visited four research vessels after the initial data gathering and presented an introduction to cybersecurity to the ARF personnel at the RVTEC meeting.
Trusted CI and ARF on the R/V Robert Gordon Sproul
The engagement culminated with Trusted CI delivering a 40-page final report to the ARF containing collected observations, a set of recommendations ordered by impact, and additional materials that could be used to enhance the budding cybersecurity efforts of the fleet. ARF plans to share this report with stakeholders within their community in order to help improve cybersecurity controls and practices.

During this engagement, Trusted CI staff worked with ARF to review policies and procedures, toured 4 different classes of research vessels, interviewed crew members of ships, and met with research vessel technology specialists at the research vessel technology (RVTEC) meeting in Alaska.

The Academic Research Fleet is funded by multiple NSF grants managed by the division of Ocean Sciences (Award # 1823600, 1824571, 1827383, 1827415, 1827444, 1822574, 1822670, 1824508, 1829214, 1830845, 1823566, 1822532, 1823567, 1823042, 1822954, 1827437, 1822905, 1827654, 1834650) and is a collaboration of multiple institutions.  Trusted CI would like to thank the following institutions and organizations for their collaboration in the engagement: Academic Research Fleet, Columbia University, Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium, Oregon State University, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Skidaway Institute of Oceanography, University of Alaska Fairbanks, University of HawaiĘ»i, University of Miami, University of Minnesota, University of Rhode Island, University of Washington, University-National Oceanographic Laboratory System, and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

Friday, February 14, 2020

Report on the 2019 NSF Cybersecurity Summit is now available

The Report of the 2019 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Cyberinfrastructure and Large Facilities, is now available at http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105533. The report summarizes the annual Summit that was held October 15-17, 2019, in San Diego, CA. The Summit provides a valuable opportunity for cybersecurity training and information exchange among members of the cybersecurity, cyberinfrastructure, and research communities who support NSF science projects. This sharing of challenges and experiences raises the level of cybersecurity awareness and gives Trusted CI important insights into current and evolving issues within the constituent communities.

This year’s Summit workshops, plenary sessions, and table talks reiterated some observations from previous years such as:
  • The high value of community member interaction and knowledge share
  • The threat of social engineering to cybersecurity
Emerging areas of importance to the community were also highlighted. These included
  • Inherent vulnerabilities in AI/ML
  • Maintaining data integrity

Day 1 of the Summit was dedicated to half-day and full-day training workshops. Days 2 and 3 comprised plenary presentations, panels, and keynotes that focused on the security of cyberinfrastructure projects and NSF Large Facilities. This year’s attendance totaled 143 (up from 117 in 2018), representing 84 NSF projects, including 12 of the 20 NSF Large Facilities. Almost half (46%) of the attendees actively participated in the Summit through planning, presenting, responding to the CFP, leading a workshop, and/or leading a lunch table talk. Evaluation and feedback of the 2019 Summit was very positive and constructive. We look forward to the upcoming 2020 NSF Summit that will be held September 22-24, 2020, at the Monroe Convention Center in Bloomington, Indiana.

Tuesday, February 11, 2020

Trusted CI Webinar Feb 24th at 11am ET: FABRIC with Anita Nikolich


Illinois Tech's Anita Nikolich is presenting a talk on FABRIC, the Adaptive programmaBle networked Research Infrastructure for Computer science, on February 24
th at 11am (Eastern).

Please register here. Be sure to check spam/junk folder for registration confirmation email.
Testbeds can be great for trying out new ideas and not taking down a production network, or they can be useless and impossible to figure out. FABRIC took the best of past testbeds and is creating a new, useful national research infrastructure to enable cutting-edge, exploratory research at-scale in computer networking, security, machine learning, distributed computing and applications.

It will be a nation-wide high-speed (100-1000 Gbps) network interconnecting major research centers and computing facilities that will allow researchers, operators and engineers to develop and experiment with new distributed application, compute and network architectures not possible today. FABRIC nodes can store and process information "in the network" in ways not possible in the current Internet, which will lead to completely new networking protocols, architectures and applications that address pressing problems with performance, security and adaptability in the Internet. Reaching deep into university campuses, FABRIC will connect university researchers and their local compute clusters and scientific instruments to the larger FABRIC infrastructure. The infrastructure will also provide access to public clouds, such as Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform, and Microsoft Azure. This experimental facility will allow multiple experiments to be conducted simultaneously, and is capable of incorporating real traffic and real users into experiments. For more information about FABRIC visit https://www.fabric-testbed.net.
Anita Nikolich is a Research Professor in Computer Science at Illinois Tech, Fellow at the Cyber Policy Initiative at the Harris School of Public Policy at The University of Chicago, co-organizer of the DEFCON AI Village, and ARIN Advisory Council member. She is Co-Director of FABRIC.

Join Trusted CI's announcements mailing list for information about upcoming events. To submit topics or requests to present, see our call for presentations. Archived presentations are available on our site under "Past Events."

Monday, January 27, 2020

Trusted CI Concludes SLATE Engagement

In the second half of 2019, Trusted CI and Services Layer at the Edge (SLATE) collaborated in an engagement to address cybersecurity concerns for the SLATE system.

SLATE is funded by an NSF grant managed by the Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure (Award #1724821).  SLATE accelerates collaborative scientific computing through a secure container orchestration framework focused on the Science DMZ, enabling creation of advanced multi-institution platforms and novel science gateways.  Similar approaches are already in production supporting LIGO and other scientific collaborations but as yet lack a generalized trust framework.  While innovation of the new trust model is initially occurring in the context of the OSG and the worldwide LHC computing grid (WLCG), trusted federated edge infrastructures enabling operation of advanced computing platforms will be necessary in the future to sustain a wide range of data intensive science disciplines requiring shared, scalable national and international cyberinfrastructure.

In the Trusted CI SLATE engagement, we performed an overall security analysis of the SLATE platform, identified trust relationships and key user/administrator workflows, identified a set of needed security policy documents, and began drafting the security policies. We also evaluated container security tools, explored existing applicable OSG and WLCG security policies, and gathered community input on the SLATE security program, resulting in an initial consensus around the security policies and procedures needed to enable wider adoption of the SLATE platform.

Community-driven work on the SLATE security program continues through the WLCG Federated Operations Security Working Group, which is open to all who are interested. Visit https://trustedci.org/slate for pointers to current status of the working group and https://slateci.io/docs/security-and-policies/ for pointers to current SLATE security policies as they are developed.  Visit https://hdl.handle.net/2142/106019 for the Trusted CI Slate engagement final report.

Friday, January 24, 2020

Invitation to Join Trustworthy Data Working Group

In February 2020, Trusted CI will launch a new Trustworthy Data Working Group. With the recent renewal by NSF, Trusted CI is focusing each year on a new challenge to NSF science, and this working group represents our inaugural effort for 2020. The group will survey science projects to learn about data security concerns and practices. We will analyze the survey results and develop guidance for science projects and cyberinfrastructure developers, including references to existing resources. We will then publish the survey results, along with the analysis and guidance, as a freely-available report by the end of 2020, and we will share the results in a Trusted CI webinar and in other venues.

To form this working group, Trusted CI is collaborating with the four NSF Big Data Innovation Hubs, the NSF CI CoE Pilot, the Ostrom Workshop on Data Management and Information Governance, the NSF Engagement and Performance Operations Center (EPOC), the Indiana Geological and Water Survey, the Open Storage Network, and other interested community members. Participation in the working group is open to all.

To participate:
Any questions/comments? Join the discussion on the mailing list or contact the working group chair (Jim Basney).

Tuesday, January 21, 2020

Trusted CI Webinar Jan 27th at 11am ET: REN-ISAC for Research Facilities/Projects with Kim Milford

Indiana University's Kim Milford is presenting a talk on the REN-ISAC, The Research and Education Networks Information Sharing and Analysis Center, on January 27th at 11am (Eastern).

Please register here. Be sure to check spam/junk folder for registration confirmation email.
The Research and Education Networks Information Sharing and Analysis Center (REN-ISAC) serves members within the higher education and research community by promoting cybersecurity operational protection and response. 
REN-ISAC membership is not just for university security officers! REN-ISAC has multiple membership communities that are applicable to research facilities. Kim will discuss the benefits of REN-ISAC membership that are applicable to research facility/project representatives and will solicit feedback from webinar attendees on future service offerings. 
For example, the REN-ISAC members benefit from Security Event System (SES) threat intelligence and other automated data collection and sharing tools to enable informed decisions about threats and events, as well as peer assessment services to improve the institution’s overall security posture. The REN-ISAC offers members daily cybersecurity news situational awareness, alerts and advisories, analysis reports of cybersecurity threats and mitigation, and an active, interested community of subject matter experts who provide feedback on practices and standards. The REN-ISAC also fosters professional training and development through monthly webinars, regional workshops, and an aggregate purchasing program with the SANS Institute.
Kim Milford serves as Executive Director of the REN-ISAC, working with research and education institutions, partners, and sponsors to provide services and information that allow member institutions to better defend technical environments from cyberthreats. Ms. Milford oversees administration and operations for the REN-ISAC. Ms. Milford served in several roles leading strategic IT initiatives since 2007 at Indiana University. As Chief Privacy Officer, she coordinated privacy-related efforts, chaired the Committee of Data Stewards, and directed the work of the University Information Policy Office and IU's IT incident response team. Prior to joining Indiana University, Ms. Milford worked as Information Security Officer at the University of Rochester. As Information Security Manager at University of Wisconsin-Madison from 1998 - 2005, she assisted in establishing the university's information security department and co-led in the development of an annual security conference. Ms. Milford provides cybersecurity expertise and presentations at national and regional conferences, seminars and consortia, as well as taught courses on Internet security and authored/co-authored many articles on the subject. Ms. Milford has a B.S. in Accounting from Saint Louis University in St. Louis, Missouri and a J.D. from John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois.

Join Trusted CI's announcements mailing list for information about upcoming events. To submit topics or requests to present, see our call for presentations. Archived presentations are available on our site under "Past Events."

Transition to Practice success story: Boston University - Secure multiparty computation and the Boston Women's Workforce Council

We can have security, privacy and confidentiality in pay gap analysis across many companies 

[Want to learn the basics about Transition to Practice? Read an introduction to the Trusted CI Cybersecurity Technology Transition to Practice (TTP) program >>] 

Boston University (BU) has been working with the Boston Women's Workforce Council (BWWC) since 2014 to help them understand the root causes and range of the gender wage gap and measure progress toward the goal of 100% equal pay for equal work. Secure multiparty computation (secure MPC) was the only way to get this measurement without compromising the privacy of the data, and without the risk and expense of a third-party data arbiter.

There is a lot of value from sharing data, but the more data you have, the more it can be breached, or others can use in ways you don’t want. MPC allows secure collaborative analysis of private data.

To learn more, we spoke with Mayank Varia, a research associate professor in the computer science department at Boston University (BU).

His personal research interests center around cryptography—both innovations within the field of cryptography and connecting it to problems throughout the rest of computer science and beyond such as the social sciences. He is also the co-director of the Center for Reliable Information Systems and Cyber Security (RISCS).

Trusted CI: Please tell us about the scope of your work, and how secure MPC fits into that.

M.V. RISCS is a group of people throughout BU who have either interest in cybersecurity research or interest in research studies dealing with cybersecurity generally. That includes areas like law, economics, philosophy, or areas beyond traditional computer science that are impacted by things like cybercrime, nation-state influencing, legal questions, and so on. Our group wants to see secure multiparty computation deployed around the world.

Trusted CI: What is secure MPC? What do you see as the primary benefits of secure MPC? What value does it bring to users?

M.V. Secure MPC allows organizations, state officials, companies, governments, etc., that each have private data to do collaborative analysis to learn about the data without sharing any of the data with anyone else.

You can do collaborative analysis of data that remains in these organizations’ own systems without it being breached or revealed to any other party. They don't need to find some trusted arbiter who holds the data in order to compute things for them. They can get the benefits of doing collaborative analysis, such as any kind of data science, without sacrificing the privacy or the security of the underlying data.

Trusted CI: Tell us about the use case example with the city of Boston, who the client(s) are, how the connection was made between the researchers and the users, what value they received from secure MPC, how long it took for the project, and whether they still use it.

M.V. BU has been working with the Boston Women's Workforce Council since 2014, but the story starts in 2013. BWWC was created by Mayor Thomas Menino before he retired. Creating it was one of his last big initiatives. His goal was to make Boston the premier city for working women. He brought together lots of people who had been thinking about the gender equity problem.

They wanted to understand root causes of wage gap and address them—what gets measured gets done. The goal was 100% equal pay for equal work.

They also wanted to measure how well they were doing towards that goal. The initial pledge called on any company that signs on to agree to participate in data analysis to determine what the wage gap was across the city of Boston.

When Mayor Menino retired, he met Azer Bestavros here at BU and mentioned they were stuck on the measurement component because the data was sensitive and had to remain private. Azer was familiar with secure MPC. Within a year, they convinced about 90 companies to join the compact.

MPC was the only way to get this measurement to happen. It's much cheaper, safer, easier, and more effective for nobody to have access to the data than for somebody to have access to the data.

Trusted CI: How does secure MPC keep the data secure?

M.V. Each company has their own payroll information. Each company goes to the website (100talent.org) where they can drag and drop a spreadsheet that represents their payroll information. It’s the same format they already use for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

They click a button, sending the data to two different places. Data is being split such that the real data is not going anywhere, but fake encoded data is going to two separate places.

The data is being encoded in such a way that one piece of the data is going to the Boston Women's Workforce Council and one piece of the data is going to Boston University. And these two pieces have the property that individually they look like random garbage. There's no meaning in the data that Boston University gets or that the Boston Women's Workforce Council gets. But the data has the property that the two of us working together can still do an analysis over the data even though each one of us individually has no idea what it says.

Trusted CI: Who would be the broader set of target users for secure MPC? What challenges would they have that secure MPC might solve?

M.V. MPC has value but there are a few constraints for an application to be amenable to MPC. It must have pieces that involve multiple organizations. Or rather, that it crosses privacy silos. It could be even various divisions within one company that are not interested in sharing data with each other. It doesn't have to be a corporate boundary, but there must be a privacy/security boundary that's being crossed.

You'd want scenarios where there's some interesting data analysis that has either commercial or social value—where the result of the calculation is something that is safe to share, safe to make public. It should have social benefit, but the data is sensitive, protected, and can't be revealed. This is when MPC can help.

It takes a while to tease out of the researchers what they really want, as opposed to just the questions they think they can answer. The benefit of MPC is it helps them figure out what is the real question they are after. Social scientists are very good at thinking about those questions. And we can help them with how to go about doing that in a way that doesn't breach privacy and confidentiality.

Trusted CI: What if people want to use the secure MPC assets, how do they access them?

M.V. We have several software packages that are available and are open-source on GitHub (github.com/multiparty) that anyone can use:

1.    web-MPC - very easy to use
2.    JIFF – web-based but more flexible, can do more complicated analysis, but requires more tuning
3.    Conclave - for high-performance data processing at scale, where you have hundreds of gigabytes of data, and can run on the cloud

Trusted CI: Is there any type of support structure?

M.V. We have a group of professional software engineers and we are happy to collaborate with any interested parties. We also have a Collaboratory of many different interested companies. And we're always happy to have new members join. We have a website that's separate from our GitHub repository: multiparty.org.

Trusted CI: Please tell us more about the secure MPC Transition to Practice journey.

M.V. After I joined BU in 2015, I connected with Professor Azer Bestavros who, as previously stated, had learned about Boston’s need through former Mayor Menino. Azer is not a cryptographer, but he knew of MPC, so he started working with our group. It was all very serendipitous.

Since then we've been working with the Boston Women's Workforce Council for the past five years. The goal is to do an analysis every year or every other year to get a longitudinal analysis of whether we are moving rapidly towards a world of equal pay for equal work. The first calculation happened in 2015 once we built the software and started running it. The second one in 2016 and the third one in 2017. They chose not to do one in 2018. The most recent one happened in 2019. All of the 2016-17 data analyses are publicly available on the City of Boston website.

Not only did they have a problem where MPC could help, they tried solving the problem without MPC and failed. But one of the hardest pieces towards getting adoption of MPC is for people to even know that it's possible. If they had found a trusted third party that they were all somehow magically willing to use and that was willing to take the data, then this probably never would have happened.

Trusted CI: What is the chronology of MPC?

M.V. MPC has been researched since the mid-1980s as a theoretical concept, but there have been rapid advances in the last 5 years to make it practical and take it out of the lab, and benefit from faster computers. While BU has been doing theoretical research in MPC for a while, the interaction with the Mayor's office has spurred several tech transition opportunities and catalyzed even more research from our group. We are very grateful to the National Science Foundation for sponsoring all of these recent endeavors under grants #1430145 (SCOPE), #1414119 (MACS), #1718135, #1739000, 1915763 and 1931714.

Trusted CI: Are you creating a business model for transitioning secure MPC to practice, like a services model?

M.V. We are very interested in working with technology transfer partners to deploy this technology. Companies like Red Hat and Honda are interested in partnering with us and giving us grants as a university to continue this development. Because it's a symbiotic relationship, it's in their interest to see these products continue to be developed, to continue to be matured, to continue to be made faster, to be made better. Everything is also open source, so anyone is free to use it.

This work is partially supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants #1430145 (SCOPE), #1414119 (MACS), #1718135, #1739000, 1915763 and 1931714. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.