Thursday, February 25, 2021

Trusted CI Engagement Application is now Open

    Trusted CI Engagement Application Period is Open

                        Applications Due April 2, 2021

                Apply for a one-in-one engagement with Trusted CI for early 2021

 

Trusted CI is accepting applications for one-on-one engagements to be executed in July-Dec 2021. Applications are due April 2, 2020 (Slots are limited and in demand, so this is a hard deadline!)


To learn more about the process and criteria, and to complete the application form, visit our site:

http://trustedci.org/application


During Trusted CI’s first 5 years, we’ve conducted
 more than 24 one-on-one engagements with NSF-funded projects, Large Facilities, and major science service providers representing the full range of NSF science missions.  We support a variety of engagement types including: assistance in developing, improving, or evaluating an information security program; software assurance-focused efforts; identity management; technology or architectural evaluation; training for staff; and more.  

 As the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, Trusted CI’s mission is to provide the NSF community a coherent understanding of cybersecurity’s role in producing trustworthy science and the information and know-how required to achieve and maintain effective cybersecurity programs.

   

Thursday, February 18, 2021

Trusted CI Announces The 2021 Fellows

 

Trusted CI, the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, is excited to announce the Trusted CI Open Science Cybersecurity Fellows. Eight individuals with professional interests in cybersecurity have been selected from a nationally competitive pool.  During the year of their Fellowship, they will receive recognition and cybersecurity professional development including training and travel funding to cybersecurity related events.


The 2021 Trusted CI Open Science Cybersecurity Fellows are:

Deb McCaffrey

Research Computing Facilitator at Michigan Medicine

Deb McCaffrey is a Research Computing Facilitator at Michigan Medicine, the University of Michigan's health system and medical school. She fell backwards into facilitation after completing a PhD in physical chemistry at UC Berkeley and has never looked back. She loves being involved in all the different research projects on campus and learning something new every day. Her long-term career goal is to get NIH and NSF to collaborate on cyberinfrastructure and provide NSF-like programs researchers with sensitive data."

 

 


Amiya Maji

Senior Computational Scientist at Purdue University

Amiya works as a Sr. Computational Scientist at Purdue University, where he collaborates with researchers from various scientific domains to streamline their scientific processes and reduce application ‎and data bottlenecks. He also leads the software build automation and testing efforts for Purdue's HPC clusters. Amiya’s research focuses on reliability and security of distributed computing systems; more specifically on vulnerability analysis and testing of mobile and cloud applications, and of IoT devices. Amiya and his colleagues have discovered several vulnerabilities in Android mobile applications and more recently in Wear OS. Amiya is also passionate about emerging socio-technological issues such as ethical AI and spread of misinformation in social networks.




Dr. Elie Alhajjar

Research Scientist at the Army Cyber Institute (ACI)

Dr. Elie Alhajjar is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute (ACI) and jointly an Assistant Professor in the Department of Mathematical Sciences at the United States Military Academy (USMA) in West Point, NY, where he teaches and mentors cadets from all academic disciplines. His research interests include mathematical modeling machine learning and network analysis, from a cybersecurity viewpoint. He has presented his research work in international meetings in North America, Europe, and Asia. Before coming to West Point, Dr. Elie Alhajjar had a research appointment at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, MD. He holds a Master of Science and a PhD in mathematics from George Mason University, as well as master’s and bachelor’s degrees from Notre Dame  University.  

 

Matthew Peterson

Senior Faculty Research Assistant at Oregon State Univ.

Matthew is a Senior Faculty Research Assistant at Oregon State University's (OSU) Center for Genome Research and Biocomputing, where he is responsible for managing REDCap (Research Electronic Data Capture) platforms, assisting with health-related data management in the Cloud, and developing software pipelines for computational processing of genomics laboratory data. This past year, he has also been responsible for secure data management for the OSU TRACE-COVID-19 study that examines the prevalence of the novel coronavirus in communities. Matthew holds an M.S. in Applied Information Management from the University of Oregon and a Graduate Certificate in College and University Teaching from OSU. He is passionate about teaching and serves as an instructor for high performance computing and programming courses.

 


Mauricio Tavares

System and Network Administrator at RENCI

Mauricio Tavares has worked in the credit card and medical industry, which led to an interest in the behavioral aspect of data security and privacy.  He has published in topics ranging from aerospace engineering to computer automation and data privacy.  At RENCI he is a member of the FABRIC security working group helping craft the policies and procedures and advise IT staff to effectively protect this multinational research project."

 


Richard Wagner

Systems Integration Engineer at University of California, San Diego

Rick is part of the UCSD Research IT team, where he helps design and build cyberinfrastructure solutions for highly complex research projects that cut across the campus and beyond it. His career began with using cyberinfrastructure as a tool for research in astrophysics, solving data challenges in cosmology and supersonic turbulence. From there he worked in HPC at the San Diego Supercomputer and with Globus at the University of Chicago.



Shuyuan Mary Ho

Associate Professor at Florida State University

Shuyuan’s research focuses on trusted human-computer interactions, investigating issues of computer-mediated deception, disinformation, cyberbullying, hate speech, cloud forensics, cyber insider threat, and interactive cyber defense. She adopts heuristic approaches to coaching the next-gen cybersecurity workforce. Shuyuan is a sociotechnical behavioral scientist designing human-centered computing experiments that simulate complex trust interactions in cyberinfrastructure. Novel methodologies are invented to computationally model the defense of cyberspace, while addressing information ethics and privacy.




Michael Kyle

Scientific Applications Consultant at University of Delaware

Michael’s background is in Meteorology and has several years of experience as a scientific programmer. He currently works at the University of Delaware (UD) in the Information Technologies Research Cyberinfrastructure unit. In this role, Michael works directly with UD’s researchers and its partnering organizations to assist them in the best use of UD’s HPC resources. He is currently working on a Master’s in Cybersecurity at UD and wants to combine his passions for cybersecurity and research cyberinfrastructure to continue developing a safe, and secure computing environment for all types of research.


The Fellows will receive training consisting of a Virtual Institute, providing 20 hours of basic cybersecurity training over six months. The training will be delivered by Trusted CI staff and invited speakers. The Virtual Institute will be presented as a weekly series via Zoom and recorded to be publicly available for later online viewing. Travel support is budgeted (during their first year only) to cover fellows’ attendance at the NSF Cybersecurity Summit, PEARC, and one professional development opportunity agreed to with Trusted CI. The Fellows will be added to an email list to discuss any challenges they encounter that will receive prioritized attention from Trusted CI staff. Trusted CI will recognize the Fellows on its website and social media. Fellowships are funded for one year, after which the Trusted CI Fellows will be encouraged to continue participating in Trusted CI activities in the years following their fellowship year. After their training in the Virtual Institute, Fellows, with assistance from the Trusted CI team, are expected to help their science community with cybersecurity and make them aware of Trusted CI for complex needs. By the end of the year, they will be expected to present or write a short white paper on the cybersecurity needs of their community and some initial steps they will take (or have taken) to address these needs. After the Fellowship year Trusted CI will continue to recognize the cohort of Fellows and give them prioritized attention. Over the years, this growing cohort of Fellows will broaden and diversify Trusted CI’s impact.

 About the Trusted CI Fellows Program

Trusted CI serves the scientific community as the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, providing leadership in and assistance in cybersecurity in the support of research. In 2019, Trusted CI establish an Open Science Cybersecurity Fellows program. This program establish and support a network of Fellows with diversity in both geography and scientific discipline. These fellows will have access to training and other resources to foster their professional development in cybersecurity. In exchange, they will champion cybersecurity for science in their scientific and geographic communities and communicate challenges and successful practices to Trusted CI.

Fellows come from a variety of career stages. They demonstrate a passion for their area, the ability to communicate ideas effectively, and a real interest in the role of cybersecurity in research. Fellows are empowered to talk about cybersecurity to a wider audience, network with others who share a passion for cybersecurity for open science and learn key skills that benefit them and their collaborators.

Tuesday, February 16, 2021

Trusted CI Begins Engagement with Open OnDemand

 

Open OnDemand is funded by NSF OAC and is an open-source HPC portal based on the Ohio Supercomputer Center original OnDemand portal. The goal of Open OnDemand is to provide an easy way for system administrators to provide web access to their HPC resources.

Open OnDemand is now facing increased community adoption. As a result, it is becoming a critical production service for many HPC centers and clients. By improving the overall security of the project, we will ensure that it continues to be a trusted and reliable platform for the hundreds of centers and tens of thousands of clients that regularly utilize it. 

Open OnDemand has engaged with Trusted CI to support their efforts to further develop the project’s ability to produce secure software. Trusted CI previously conducted an in-depth vulnerability assessment applying the FPVA methodology to Open OnDemand software. The results of this prior assessment will help to inform the activities of this engagement. During the course of the prior FPVA assessment, Trusted CI staff worked directly to test Open OnDemand’s software to identify vulnerabilities with support from the Open OnDemand team. Trusted CI will now work with Open OnDemand to improve the project’s ability to maintain the security of their software as changes are made and to identify and mitigate future vulnerabilities.

Upon completion of the engagement, Trusted CI will produce a published report describing the work performed, potential impact to the open-science community, and areas Open OnDemand may find appropriate for future engagements.

Monday, February 15, 2021

Trusted CI Begins Engagement with FABRIC

FABRIC: Adaptive Programmable Research Infrastructure for Computer Science and Science Applications, funded under NSF grants 1935966 and 2029261, is a national scale testbed that connects to prior existing testbeds, such as PAWR, as well as the real Internet. FABRIC aims to expand its outreach, enabling new science applications, using a diverse array of networks, integrating machine learning, and preparing the next generation of computer science researchers.

The FABRIC project began in 2019 and reached out to Trusted CI for an engagement during this early phase of development. The engagement goals are focused on reviewing FABRIC's software development process, the trust boundaries in the FABRIC system, and the FABRIC security and monitoring architecture.

We will be publishing a report from the engagement when it concludes in June.

Monday, February 8, 2021

Trusted CI Webinar: CARE: Cybersecurity in Application, Research and Education Mon Feb 22 @11am Eastern

Temple University's Aunshul Rege is presenting the talk, CARE: Cybersecurity in Application, Research and Education on Monday February 22nd at 11am (Eastern)

Please register here. Be sure to check spam/junk folder for registration confirmation email.

In an era where big data, machine learning algorithms, and simulations are used to understand cyberattacks and cybersecurity, is there room for qualitative or 'thick' data? This talk shares a social scientist’s perspective on the relevance of thick data in understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of adversarial behavior, movement, decision-making, adaptation to disruptions, and group dynamics. More specifically, it highlights potential for symbiotic relationships between social science methodologies, such as observations and focus groups, and technical methodologies, such as time series analysis, social network analysis, and machine learning and prediction. The talk will then share how social science students must be trained via discipline-specific education to effectively engage in the cybersecurity discourse. It details specific educational efforts via social engineering course projects and capture-the-flag competitions that not only cater to social science students, but also technical students, and how these efforts help break silos to foster multidisciplinary dialog.

Speaker Bio: Dr. Aunshul Rege is an Associate Professor with the Department of Criminal Justice. She is the Director of the CARE (Cybersecurity in Application, Research, and Education) Lab, which focuses on the human and social aspects of cyberattacks and cybersecurity. Dr. Rege is the recipient of numerous National Science Foundation grants, including the prestigious NSF CAREER award. Her research examines adversarial decision-making, adaptation and movement, and she has worked with Computer Scientists and Engineers in academia, industry and government. Dr. Rege and her team at the CARE Lab have generated a critical infrastructure ransomware incident dataset, which maps to the MITRE ATT&CK framework and is highly requested by organizations, governments, academics, and students from all over the world. Dr. Rege is also passionate about cybersecurity education and has designed several experiential social engineering learning projects, which have been mapped to the NICE cybersecurity workforce framework and downloaded worldwide by educators and businesses. A month ago, she hosted a purely social engineering capture the flag competition at Temple University, which featured professional social engineers as judges and six undergraduate student teams. This competition is the first cybersecurity capture-the-flag competition to emphasize the human factor that is grounded in the social sciences. Dr. Rege has received a new NSF education grant, which will allow her to pursue this endeavor starting 2021. Not only has Dr. Rege's work been published in well-regarded journals and peer-reviewed conference proceedings, but her efforts have also been recognized in highly regarded cybersecurity outlets like Security Week, Bleeping Computer, and Dark Reading. She hopes to continue to make the social sciences more mainstream and embedded in the cybersecurity discourse.

Join Trusted CI's announcements mailing list for information about upcoming events. To submit topics or requests to present, see our call for presentations. Archived presentations are available on our site under "Past Events."

 

Wednesday, February 3, 2021

Trusted CI and SGCI Collaborate to Secure the Galaxy Science Gateway Platform

Galaxy, an open-source, scientific workflow system developed by the Galaxy Project (GP) Community, provides a means to build multi-step computational analyses using a graphical web user interface that allows a user to specify the type of data to operate on, what steps to take, and in what order. It accelerates innovation by allowing researchers to carry out analyses without having to do any programming. Galaxy is also heavily used as a tool integration platform for biology and genomics with thousands of popular tools available. It supports data uploads from a user endpoint and many well-known, online data sources (such as the UCSC Genome Browser, BioMart, and InterMine), allowing users to analyze public data or bring their own.

In the second half of 2020, the Galaxy Project team engaged with Trusted CI to review the security of a new Galaxy software distribution being developed as a containerized package, with an eye toward its use with sensitive information such as protected health information (PHI). The Trusted CI team used effort funded by the SGCI and Trusted CI partnership.

The teams met weekly over the engagement period to develop a shared understanding of Galaxy’s architecture, data flows, existing safeguards, and software development practices. Trusted CI used the NIST 800-53 control catalog to guide the discussions and created a Galaxy System Security Plan (SSP), which will be offered to the Galaxy Community as a template to support compliance with security regulations for local installations. The engagement concluded with a report containing a series of recommendations to further improve Galaxy’s security posture. Trusted CI also identified opportunities for future engagements between Trusted CI and Galaxy as the scope for the present engagement was limited to the containerized package.

The Trusted CI team would like to extend our sincere thanks to the entire Galaxy team for their partnership throughout the engagement and we look forward to future opportunities to collaborate.

Wednesday, January 27, 2021

2020 Trusted CI Fellow, Laura Christopherson, reports on Science and Security

Laura Christopherson, a 2020 Trusted CI Fellow, prepared the following final report, and agreed to publish it on the Trusted CI blog. 

Science and Security: Sound Odd?

I served as a Trusted CI Fellow during 2020 while also working on the Cyberinfrastructure Center of Excellence (CI CoE) Pilot project.1 In fact, it was through the CI CoE that I learned about Trusted CI and became interested in the fellowship. Over the past year, my work with CI CoE and the fellowship exposed me to the importance of information security in science. When I mentioned this intersection of science and security to friends or others outside of technology and academia, I often got puzzled looks. I think part of the confusion was because I was mainly talking about earth sciences (which is the type of research largely conducted by the research facilities that CI CoE supports) and I suppose people initially assumed I must be talking about health sciences. They could, of course, understand why security would be important in medicine. We all want our personal information (e.g., medical records) protected. And since March of 2020, COVID has been the leading story in all news sources, and those stories have included discussions about the importance of maintaining the integrity of COVID research data so that we can develop a vaccine as quickly as possible. It's a life or death issue. 

When it was suggested that other kinds of sciences, other kinds of research, might need some protection however, then they seemed a little dumbfounded. For instance, I received comments to the effect of, "Well why would anyone want to steal images of a black hole? It's not private, confidential information. It's up there for all to see." And after all, don't we want to share this information? That's why scientists shared the first image of a black hole in April of 2019.2 That gave me pause, I admit: Well yeah, that's not private, personal information. No person would be compromised in any way or suffer any harm if the read-outs from a particle accelerator where disclosed by WikiLeaks, right? Earth science is not a life-or-death situation, after all. There’s no money in stealing data from Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO)3 or IceCube.4 Furthermore, don't people want this information shared? What about all that "open science" jazz anyway?

While it may be true that cyber thieves would be less inclined to attempt to steal information or disrupt the activities of scientists when sexier alternatives are available (e.g., the bank accounts of millions of Wells Fargo users, presidential election tabulations, juicy emails between a senator and his mistress, design schematics of a nuclear warhead, personal health information of patients participating in a highly controversial drug trial), it is possible that cyber criminals—in targeting those sexier-alternatives—may unknowingly hit humble research organizations because they also happen to use the same systems that businesses and governments use. The SolarWinds hack5 is a good example of this, as described by Kim Milford, the executive director of the Research and Education Networks Information Sharing and Analysis Center at Indiana University. "While it does not seem at this time that higher education institutions or sensitive research secrets were the target of this attack, it is possible that hackers may have scooped up so much information they do not yet realize what they have," Milford said in an Inside Higher Ed article. In other words, cyberattackers may unknowingly steal a scientific easter egg that they could crack later for what may turn out to be a goldmine of competitive research secrets.  

When I think about the comments I received, I'm just not sure if the everyday Joe or Jane even thinks about science when considering the importance of security. I suspect they largely think about themselves and their personal information instead. It's only natural. But I wanted to understand how to articulate the importance of information security in science. So, I set out to find information on various questions around the intersection of science and security. Putting aside healthcare-related research (for the remainder of this paper), I wanted to know:
  • How does the average American conceive of security? What are average concerns about  information security? Do scientific research organizations even enter the picture for the average American? Does the average American think it is important to protect scientific research?
  • Do scientific research facilities get attacked? What risks do they face? 
I scoured the library's databases of research articles, traipsed through the Internet using a variety of search terms, perused various polling/social science research organization websites (e.g., Pew, the National Academies Press), trolled through popular online tech magazines and blogs, and was ultimately unable to find fully satisfactory answers to my questions. So, I asked Von Welch, director of Trusted CI, the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, if he knew of any reports of attacks on scientific research organizations. He was able to locate only two publications related to this subject: one from the  Australian National University,6 reporting a breach to their administrative systems, and an FBI case study7 reporting attacks on military sites, federal research labs, universities, and other sites, discovered in 2004 and resulting in the arrest of a 19-year-old man in 2005. 

It appears that there is dearth of information on:
  • The public's awareness of or views on whether security matters in science
  • Threats faced by scientific research organizations
  • Consequences and impacts if scientific research organizations experience loss or damage to            precious research findings.
In my review of information about attacks/security in the non-academic/research world, I uncovered two themes. One was about the nature of the attack and the second about who is usually attacked. The nature of an attack is often described as a theft of some kind. There always appears to be some discussion of what was lost and its value, what the hacker sought as his reward. The most commonly discussed prizes seem to be money (Wells Fargo bank accounts), power (presidential election tabulations), reputation (juicy emails), strength (nuclear warhead), or access to some deep secret (personal health information). Because earth science data won't really give you money, power, reputation, and strength in the way we usually think about those things, and because it won't give you access to deep, dark, personal secrets to leverage against your enemies, why would a cyber thief bother? 

Frequently discussed targets of attacks were financial institutions (money), governmental institutions (power), nations (strength), and individuals (reputation and secrets). (Research bodies are also mentioned but they tend to be those that conduct biomedical research which I would still classify as reputation and secrets, because the data at risk is often personal information of specific individuals, and it is often the risk to these individuals that the discussion centers on.) 

Had I surveyed the news over the past decade, I imagine I would have found very similar results… that most news stories primarily report on that which was stolen from individuals, profit seeking businesses, or governmental/national/political organizations. Off the top of my head, when I think of recent, big news stories about security, I think Russia and the 2016 presidential election, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, Independence Blue Cross, Wannacry (ransomware), Target, Hillary Clinton's email server, Cal Cunningham (NC senatorial candidate), and Equifax, to name a few. I can't think of a single instance of any news story discussing an attack on an earth science research facility. Although my personal recollections don't confirm the absence of attacks (i.e., it just confirms that I haven't heard of any), I still ask you, my reader, did you hear of any? If you did, how many compared to the other kinds of attacks you also heard about? I suspect it's just not a hot topic for most news outlets.

The point of all this is to say that in spite of not finding any information that said, "Hell yeah, security is really important in science, for good reason,” I still conclude that Hell yeah, security is really important in science for good reason… in fact the same reasons, but perhaps with a different way of thinking about them. First, I think the more mainstream definition of security and what it means to secure data might require expansion when discussing research. For instance, many of the research facilities we work with in CI CoE have to protect their data from harsh environmental conditions. IceCube is located at the South Pole. Its equipment could freeze and data could be lost. So the data must be protected… from the ice (less so probably than from some hacker). 

Additionally it may be worthwhile to rethink those more commonly discussed prizes (money, power, reputation, strength, and juicy secrets). If we concede that a cyberattacker is less likely to find these prizes from stealing scientific data, do they (money, power, reputation, strength, and juice secrets) enter into the discussion at all? I would say yes, but in a different way. Instead of being the reward at the end of the maze, I would argue that they are qualities inherent to science and so can't be stolen from it. They are not the hoped-for results of some activity (e.g., theft), but that which is intrinsic to science, and consequently, make it so vital to protect science. 

Money = Valuable 

The NSF spends millions of dollars funding earth science research. If research activities are disrupted, if data is corrupted or lost, then that money has been wasted. So although you may not get rich off of studying earthquakes or by stealing images of the moon, science is a priority in our society and we've invested decades of money into it. The American public's tax dollars support scientific research, and we all want a good return on our investment. This affects us all. 

Power = Powerful  

It is said that "knowledge is power." Science seeks to uncover new knowledge, and it has empowered us in numerous ways. Consider a very simple and practical example of how science has improved our everyday lives. Because we sought to understand electricity and harness its power, we are able to enjoy the comfort of heating and cooling, have light to see by, and can enjoy hot meals cooked on a stove from ingredients preserved in a refrigerator. Science also tackles issues vital to our survival as a species on this planet. It explores questions about natural energy (which can be used to power medical devices that keep us alive), our carbon footprint (which impacts the resilience of Earth's ability to sustain life), and weather and climate change (which affects the habitability of Earth, important when considering future generations). So, in a sense, earth science is a life or death issue after all, but perhaps on a broader scale, because it concerns mankind as a whole.

Reputation = Noteworthy

Because we depend on science for so many things, it is important that the outcomes of scientific studies are accurate. If scientific data is put at risk, it calls into question the findings of scientific researchers. Years of work can be invalidated, reputations destroyed, and trust eroded. Each year in the history of our existence, we have continued to build upon this knowledge. We have a very sizeable bank account of knowledge from which to draw on and help us advance. Just as our personal or business bank accounts containing money ought to be protected, so should this wealth of knowledge the scientific community has socked away.

Strength/Bold

To use another cliché, it is said that "there is strength in numbers." Most of the science research facilities that we work with in the CI CoE serve thousands of scientists (students and professionals) from around the world. For example, the partnership of the Seismological Facilities for the Advancement of Geoscience (SAGE)8 and the Geodetic Facility for the Advancement of Geoscience9 estimate they serve, roughly, 10,000 scientists worldwide. NOIRLab10 (a collection of five telescopes) estimates a user base of 3,000-5,000 per quarter. The Natural Hazards Engineering Research Infrastructure (NHERI) is composed of multiple units. One of those, DesignSafe,  which provides computation services for analyzing hazards data, estimates a user base of 5,000, with roughly 1,000 using their services each month. If each of these facilities serve approximately 1,000 people each month, then they collectively serve several hundreds of thousands of scientists (students and professionals) from a variety of earth-science disciplines throughout each year. 

These facilities also manage very large datasets. NHERI-DesignSafe manages roughly 200 TBs of data. The Oceans Observatory Initiative12 pulls in around 15,000 rows of data every 30 seconds, roughly 10 TBs of data every three months. The Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source (CHESS)13 collects around 120 TBs every few months. SAGE ingests around 10 TBs of data per year and has a total archive of roughly 650 TBs that has been collected over 40 years. The image archive for NOIRLab manages almost five PBs of data.  

Within these PBs of data is the possibility to uncover tremendous new insights about our world. Scientists from all over the globe depend on these facilities to support their work. Even though the present-day Galileo may not come to mind when thinking of information security, he and many others exist, and they rely on these PBs and PBs of data to uncover new knowledge about our world. Across the various facilities we serve in CI CoE, there exists a very strong userbase that uses extremely large, multifaceted datasets that may very well exceed the bytes needed to store the emails on Hillary Clinton's server, the Target credit card accounts that were breached, and the 2016 election tabulations that may have been tampered with. 

Secrets = Discoveries

Science data probably doesn't contain any personal information that might embarrass someone, put them in a negative light, or compromise their credit rating. However, it probably does contain an entire host of secrets that, unlike personal secrets, we want and need to uncover. For instance, LIGO collected data for more than a decade, waiting to discover new knowledge, before they finally detected gravitational waves that allowed us to look back 1.3 billion light years at two colliding black holes.

This discovery comes at the culmination of decades of instrument research and development, through a world-wide effort of thousands of researchers, and made possible by dedicated support for LIGO from the National Science Foundation. It also proves a prediction made 100 years ago by Einstein that gravitational waves exist. More excitingly, it marks the beginning of a new era of gravitational wave astronomy – the possibilities for discovery are as rich and boundless as they have been with light-based astronomy.14 

So to end on that auspicious note, I hope I have made a good case for the importance of security for science, in spite of the lack of research I was able to find in this area. It is because of this lack of work, that I will now try to convince you of one last thing: There needs to be more research in this area. In the Inside Higher Ed SolarWinds article, Kim Milford encourages "cybersecurity leaders to provide thought leadership and guidance" on this subject. 

For my part, I suggest there be work around the following questions/themes:

What does security look like in science? What are the threats?

I have suggested that it may be unlikely that cyber thieves will target science when it doesn't really afford them the prizes they may typically seek. So security may be less about guarding against malicious actors and more about making sure the data is well protected from other kinds of threats faced by so many research facilities. Perhaps this calls for redefining security when applied to science.

Are earth-science facilities the targets of malicious attacks? If so, how and why does this happen? How does that compare with the other threats they face?

Although I found little evidence of malicious attacks, Von Welch was able to locate information on the subject, so malicious attacks do happen. Why do they happen if they don't yield the same prizes that are stolen from other types of targets? Are there things to be gained—other prizes—I did not imagine? If so, this may be very helpful information to technology professionals working in science. It could also expose other dimensions to the motivations of black hat hackers, which could be explored by social scientists as well as computer scientists.

Why is it important to protect science? How does science benefit us all? 

I have suggested that when people think of security, they tend to think of themselves, their valuables, their secrets, their associations; and that perhaps this is why science may fail to come to mind when thinking about security. I have also attempted to point out that science has implications beyond the individual, group, or organization, that it concerns and benefits mankind as a whole. If this is so, then it is particularly important to raise awareness about the importance of protecting scientific data. I believe this will also help validate the work of technology professionals who stand guard at the gates of science. We hear about the latest scientific discovery and the scientists involved, but the contributions these guardians make to science may not be considered newsworthy. I get the sense that, as a result, they are often overlooked and perhaps not valued in the way they deserve. So I urge both the science and technology community to work on changing this.

Finally, I think future Trusted CI Fellows are the perfect candidates to explore these questions and to publish on these subjects. I hope that I have inspired future Fellows to pursue these questions. May they achieve success no matter what they pursue in the future, and I wish them well.

1 https://cicoe-pilot.org
2 https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/edu/news/2019/4/19/how-scientists-captured-the-first-image-of-a-black-hole/
3 https://www.ligo.caltech.edu/
4 https://icecube.wisc.edu/
5 https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/01/06/unraveling-solarwinds-hacks-fallout-higher-ed
6 Australian National University. (2019). Incident Report on the Breach of the Australian National University's Administrative Systems. https://imagedepot.anu.edu.au/scapa/Website/SCAPA190209_Public_report_web_2.pdf
7 Ricker, Kathleen & Barlow, James & Adams, Craig. (2008). FBI Major Case 216: A Case Study. 10.13140/2.1.2775.2644.
8 https://www.iris.edu/hq/news/story/nsf_makes_5_year_93m_award_to_iris_to_manage_the_sage_facility
9 https://www.unavco.org/about/about.html
10 https://noirlab.edu/public/
11 https://www.designsafe-ci.org/
12 https://oceanobservatories.org/
13 https://www.chess.cornell.edu/
14 https://www.ligo.caltech.edu/detection